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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

N°05/13 MAY 2013 | GOVERNANCE

Reiko Hasegawa (IDDRI)

JAPAN’S 2011 DISASTER: RESPONSES TO NATURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES The triple disaster that hit the Tohoku region of Japan on 11 March 2011

triggered a massive human displacement: more than 400,000 people

evacuated their homes as a gigantic tsunami induced by a magnitude 9.0

earthquake engulfed the coastal areas, and the following nuclear accident

in Fukushima released a large amount of radioactive materials into the

atmosphere. This study analyses the disaster response, with a particular

focus on evacuation of the population, and social consequences of this

complex crisis, based on intensive fieldwork carried out one year after the

catastrophe. It reveals that the responses of the Japanese authorities and

population were significantly different between a natural disaster and an

industrial (man-made) accident.

TWO EVACUATION PATTERNS: RISK PERCEPTION VERSUS VULNERABILITY Being prone to both earthquakes and tsunamis, Japan had been preparing

itself against such risks for many years. A tsunami alert was immediately

issued and the population knew how and where to evacuate. In contrast,

the evacuation from the nuclear accident was organised in total chaos, as

a severe accident or large-scale evacuation had never been envisaged—let

alone exercised—before the disaster. The population was thus forced to

flee with no information as to the gravity of the accident or radiation risk.

In both cases, the risk perception prior to the catastrophe played a key role

in determining the vulnerability of the population at the time of the crisis.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THE DISASTER: DIVIDED COMMUNITIES AND FAMILIES While tsunami evacuees are struggling with a slow reconstruction

process due to financial difficulties, nuclear evacuees are suffering from

uncertainty as to their prospect of return. One year after the accident,

the Japanese authorities began to encourage nuclear evacuees to return

to the areas contaminated by radiation according to a newly established

safety standard. This triggered a vivid controversy within the affected

communities, creating a rift between those who trust the government’s

notion of safety and those who do not. The nuclear disaster has thus

become a major social disaster in Japan dividing and weakening the

affected communities.w w

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Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings,

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materials are those of the various authors and are

not necessarily those of IDDRI’s board.

Citation: Hasegawa, R. (2013), Disaster Evacua-

tion from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the

Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Studies No.05/13.

IDDRI, Paris, France, 54 p.

The author would like to thank both the French

and Japanese DEVAST teams for their signifi-

cant inputs and contributions in producing this

study, especially Dr Francois Gemenne (IDDRI),

Project Leader of the French DEVAST team, and

Dr Alexandre Magnan (IDDRI) for the very great

support they extended throughout the implemen-

tation of the project. The author also received

valuable and insightful advice from Dr Michel

Colombier, Scientific Director of IDDRI, and

Professor Claude Henry of Sciences Po/Columbia

University (Chair of the Scientific Council of

IDDRI). Special thanks go to Ms Rina Kojima, who

worked as an intern during the fieldwork in Japan.

Without her help, many of the interviews would

have simply been unrealisable. The field research

was successfully conducted thanks to Associate

Professor Norichika Kanie of the Tokyo Institute

of Technology (TITech), who kindly hosted IDDRI

researchers in his office during the field mission,

and also to Mr Shinji Tanada, Ms Yui Nakagawa

and Ms Miho Akatsuka, who provided valuable

assistance in conducting field visits. My sincere

thanks are also extended to all the evacuees and

municipal officers who agreed to be interviewed

despite their difficult circumstances. Lastly, the

author would like to express sincere gratitude to

the French National Research Agency (ANR) and

the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST),

which provided the necessary funding for the

project implementation.

For more information about this document,

please contact the author:

Reiko Hasegawa – [email protected]

ISSN 2258-7535

IDÉES POUR LE DÉBAT 05/2011 3IDDRI

Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Reiko Hasegawa (IDDRI)

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 4

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

1. INTRODUCTION 9

2. METHODOLOGY 9

3. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI 15 3.1. Overview of the event 15 3.2. Disaster response and evacuation 15 3.3. Perception of risk 17 3.4. Prospects of resettlement 19 3.5. Post-disaster challenges 20

4. THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT 22 4.1. Overview of the event 22 4.2. Disaster Response and Evacuation 23 4.3. Perception of risk 28 4.4. Prospects of return 30 4.5. Post-disaster challenges 35

5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TSUNAMI EVACUATION AND THE NUCLEAR EVACUATION 42

6. CONCLUSIONS 44

REFERENCES 46

APPENDICES 48 Appendix 1: Questionnaire for evacuees

(tsunami and nuclear) 48 Appendix 2: Questionnaire for

self-evacuees (only nuclear) 49 Appendix 3: Questionnaire for

municipalities 50 Appendix 4: List of meetings and seminars

attended during the field research 52 Appendix 5: Map of nuclear power plants

in Japan 53

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Number of persons interviewed 11 Figure 1. Age of evacuees interviewed 11 Figure 2. Gender of evacuees interviewed 11 Table 2. Target municipalities for interviews 13 Map 1. The Tohoku region and three heavily affected prefectures 14

Map 2. Map of Fukushima Prefecture 14 Map 3. Example of a hazard map (Rikuzentakada City) 17

Figure 3. Photos of temporary shelters (prefabricated housing) 19

Figure 4. Changes in the number Fukushima evacuees 23

Figure 5. Changes in the total number of evacuees 23

Table 3. Chronology of the Government’s evacuation orders/recommendations 24

Map 4. Official evacuation zones prior to 30 September 2011 24

Figure 6. Trends in public opinion on nuclear energy 31

Map 5. Reorganisation of the evacuation zone (as from August 2012) 32

Table 4. The government’s proposal on the reorganisation of the evacuation zone 33

Figure 7. Changes in willingness to return 34 Figure 8. Willingness to return according to age 34

Map 6. Radiation contour map of the affected region 40

Table 5. Comparative analysis of the two evacuations 43

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AAR Association for Aid and Relief

ADRA Adventist Development and Relief

Agency

ANR Agence nationale de la recherche

(France)

FoE Friends of the Earth

ICANPS Investigation Committee on the

Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear

Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power

Company (appointed by the Cabinet

Office)

IIC Independent Investigation Commission

on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

JST Japan Science and Technology Agency

M Magnitude

METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and

Industry

MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,

Science and Technology

MHLW Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare

NAIIC Fukushima Nuclear Accident

Independent Investigation Commission

(appointed by The National Diet)

NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

(under METI)

(replaced by the Nuclear Regulation

Authority in September 2012)

NGO Non-governmental organisation

NSC Nuclear Safety Commission (under the

Cabinet Office)

(integrated into the Nuclear Regulation

Authority since September 2012)

NUMO Nuclear Waste Management

Organization of Japan

OCHA United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company

TITech Tokyo Institute of Technology

UNU United Nations University

Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

STUDY 05/2013 1 5IDDRI

3. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI

3.1. Overview of the event

On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake

struck off the Pacific coast of Tohoku in north-

eastern Honshu, the main island of Japan. The

tremor triggered a tsunami that had a mean inun-

dation height of 10–15 m and a run-up height of

40 m in some places (Mori and Takahashi, 2012:

pp.1 and 13). According to the National Police

Agency, 15,871 people lost their lives, with 2,778

people missing (feared dead) and 6,114 people

injured, as on 10 October 2012.13 Nearly 400,000

houses were either severely damaged or comple-

tely destroyed. The Cabinet Office estimates

the direct financial damage from the disaster at

approximately 16.7 trillion yen (€167 billion).14 It

was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded

in Japan,15 and one of the world’s biggest earth-

quakes after the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake

(M 9.1–9.3). The then Japanese Prime Minister,

Naoto Kan, described the disaster as the worst

crisis that Japan has had to face since the Second

World War.

According to the official figure, the disaster dis-

placed a total of 386,739 people, recorded at one

week after the disaster.16 In March 2012, one year

on from the disaster, the number was still as high

as 344,290,17 which indicates that most of the evac-

uees had not yet returned to their home or reset-

tled in permanent shelters. Half of these evacuees

originate from the Fukushima Prefecture and most

were displaced following the nuclear accident.

The number of evacuees who left on account of

the earthquake and tsunami alone can thus be es-

timated at around 170,000 people.

These evacuees are currently accommodated

in three types of temporary shelters: prefabricat-

ed houses, private apartments and public-sector

apartments. As early as April 2011, one month af-

ter the disaster, prefabricated houses were erected

13 Source: National Police Agency (http://www.npa.

go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf). (in Japa-

nese)

14 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.bousai.go.jp/oshi-

rase/h23/110624-1kisya.pdf). (in Japanese)

15 Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). (http://

www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake/2011_Earth-

quake.html). (in Japanese)

16 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-

hisaisha/pdf/5-hikaku.pdf). (in Japanese)

17 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-

struction.go.jp/ topics/ 120413hinansya.pdf). (in Japa-

nese)

to house the displaced population. By May 2012,

a total of 52,858 prefabricated houses had been

constructed for the disaster evacuees, of which

48,884 units are currently occupied.18 There were

68,317 families living in private apartments, with

rent covered by the government. Public-sector

apartments, which were initially built to provide

housing for public servants, were also utilised as

evacuee accommodation. There were 19,041 of

such apartments occupied by the evacuees.

3.2. Disaster response and evacuation

This sub-section presents the major findings from

the field interviews on the disaster response and

evacuation process induced by the earthquake and

tsunami.

Evacuation with a tsunami warning that underestimated the gravity of the situation Japan is a country prone to earthquakes and

tsunamis due to its geological conditions. Over

the years, it has thus developed an adaptation and

disaster prevention mechanism using advanced

technologies. The coastal communities of Tohoku

in particular had prepared themselves for the

eventuality of a disaster, as they have already

experienced many tsunamis. When the earth-

quake hit the Tohoku region on 11 March 2011, the

tsunami warning was issued by the Japan Meteo-

rological Agency (JMA) only three minutes after

the earthquake, and immediately disseminated

to the municipalities likely to be impacted (JMA

2011b: p.3). The warning was then transmitted

through loudspeakers installed in these coastal

towns for the purpose of public broadcasting. The

disaster prevention mechanism was thus acti-

vated as planned. However, the field interviews

revealed that the system had many shortcomings.

First, the estimated tsunami height announced in

the warning was considerably different from the

actual tsunami height. The JMA issued a warning

of a 6 m tsunami for Miyagi Prefecture and no

more than a 3 m tsunami for Iwate and Fukushima

Prefectures (JMA 2011a: p.3). On hearing this

alert, some residents decided to stay on the second

floor of their house instead of evacuating to higher

ground. In addition, the fact that these coastal

towns had 5–10 m breakwaters built along the

coast for protection against the inflow of tsunami

waves further delayed the residents’ decision to

flee. One evacuee from Ofunato City said:

18 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-

struction.go.jp/topics/120521genjototorikumi.pdf). (in

Japanese)

STUDY 05/20131 6 IDDRI

Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

When I first heard a tsunami warning for 3

metres, I thought that it would be all right be-

cause the breakwater in our town is higher than

that.

The survey conducted by the JMA in June 2011

on the post-disaster evacuation following the

tsunami alert also collected the similar testimo-

nies from tsunami survivors (JMA, 2011a: p.5).

During our interviews, a couple of evacuees also

mentioned that those who had already evacu-

ated to higher ground even went back home after

hearing the expected height of tsunami, thinking

that they would survive in their house. Further-

more, citizen volunteers from the Community

Fire Brigade19 went to the coastal area to close the

breakwater gates, a task allocated to them by the

contingency planning, expecting the breakwater

to be high enough to stop the tsunami. Many of

them lost their lives as the tsunami engulfed the

breakwaters. In reality, the tsunami that hit the

three prefectures had a 10–15 m mean inundation

height and a 40 m run-up height in some places. It

was only after the arrival of the tsunami that the

JMA amended the height to ‘more than 10 m’ for

all three prefectures. As a result, despite the early

tsunami warning, many residents were caught by

surprise when the actual tsunami arrived.

Later, it was also discovered that the govern-

ment possessed GPS-controlled tide gauge equip-

ment, installed off the coast of Tohoku by the

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and

Tourism (MLIT), which had accurately predicted

the height of the tsunami prior to its arrival on the

coast. According to the presentation made by the

Member of Parliament, Itsunori Onodera, at the

House of Representatives on 2 February 2012, the

information from the GPS gauge was transmitted

to the JMA before the tsunami arrived, but the

JMA did not take this into account until after the

event as it was neither part of their procedure nor

integrated into their method of calculating the tsu-

nami height.20

The second shortcoming of the tsunami warning

was the way in which the warning was disseminat-

ed. The alert is usually transmitted by the relevant

municipal offices via loudspeakers installed all

19 This is a voluntary fire corps formed by the residents of

each community/district in towns and cities. It partici-

pates in and helps the activities of fire fighters on a com-

munity level in case of fire and disasters.

20 The testimony of Itsunori Onodera (Liberal Demo-

cratic Party) at the House of Representatives during the

Budget Committee of the House of Representatives on

2 February 2012 can be viewed on the following site:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efGa86LURHg (in

Japanese).

over town. The interviews with evacuees and local

authorities found that many of these loudspeak-

ers did not function either because the earthquake

had knocked down the speaker poles or because

transmission had been disrupted by the power cut

following the earthquake. According to the survey

conducted by the JMA after the disaster, 17 out of

27 affected municipalities responded that their tsu-

nami alert transmission system had broken down

and did not function properly at the time of the

disaster (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,

2011: p.7). This indicates that the installed system

was simply not well adapted to the magnitude of

the disaster and thus not reliable during the actual

crises.

Thirdly, according to the interviewed survivors,

even when the public speakers were functioning,

the warning message issued by the municipal

office was given in such a polite and calm tone

(‘Please evacuate’) that the residents did not fully

appreciate its gravity. The field research found

that only 3 out of 28 interviewed evacuees had

been prompted to flee on account of the tsunami

warning transmitted by the local authority over

the loudspeakers. The majority of residents fled

after actually witnessing the tsunami, on the ba-

sis of their own judgement or previous experience,

listening to the radio broadcasts, or being directly

warned by the community fire brigade on patrol.

In summary, the tsunami warning during the

11 March disaster, although timely, suffered from

failings with respect to an assessment of the grav-

ity of the tsunami, the transmission system used

and an inadequate communication of the level of

risk.

Relief operations and a limited capacity to accept aid In the field, local governments – both municipal

and prefectural authorities – were the main coor-

dination bodies for relief operations. The inter-

views with municipal officers and aid workers

from NGOs made it clear that the affected local

authorities in the remote coastal region of Tohoku

often lacked experience in working with civil orga-

nisations such as NGOs and citizen volunteers,

and were simply overwhelmed by the number

of offers. In Ishinomaki City, according to the

Director of Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteers

Centre (PBV), the offer of volunteers was initially

turned down by the local authority on the grounds

that the city had no coordination or reception

arrangements in place for the volunteers. In addi-

tion, one municipal officer from the same city

recalled during the interview that food aid was

sometimes wasted when the person in charge of

evacuation centres, often municipal officers, did

Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

STUDY 05/2013 1 7IDDRI

not know how to distribute it properly. According

to him, when food aid of rice balls arrived in an

evacuee camp, the camp manager realised that

the number of rice balls was not enough to distri-

bute to everybody in the camp and thus decided to

simply throw them in the garbage in order to avoid

strife and chaos in the centre. In other instances,

the municipal officials managing the distribution

of relief items required the donating organisa-

tions and companies to provide ‘each survivor

with items that were exactly the same in brand,

type and size’ and, as a result, ‘many resources

were wasted or used inefficiently’ during the relief

operations (Yeoh, 2012: p.8).

The Secretary General of the Association for Aid

and Relief (ARR), which operates mainly in devel-

oping countries, also pointed out the cultural hesi-

tancy to accept aid, specific to Japanese society.

The relief operation in Tohoku made him aware

that, compared to beneficiaries in other countries,

the Japanese population generally lack the capac-

ity to seek help and accept assistance. When help is

offered, Japanese people tend to decline, either to

preserve their dignity or out of concern not to in-

convenience others. Another aid worker from AAR

recalled one scene:

When I arrived at a house badly damaged by

the tsunami, there was a woman still living in-

side the house without any electricity, water or

food. There was no heating stove either. When I

asked her what I could bring to help her, she said

‘No, don’t worry about me. There are people who

are in greater need than I am’.

In Japan, an industrialised country with a func-

tioning social welfare system, the local authori-

ties were simply not used to receiving help and

thus quickly became overwhelmed by all the of-

fers of assistance that came in from all over Japan

and abroad. Thus, the field interviews found that

the population’s cultural hesitancy to receive as-

sistance compounded the difficulties that volun-

teers, NGOs and other private donors encountered

in delivering aid to the needy during the relief

operations.

3.3. Perception of risk

The affected region of Tohoku had long been aware

of the tsunami risk and was thus highly prepared

for the eventuality prior to the disaster. This sub-

section attempts to analyse how this perception

influenced individual decisions to flee and disaster

mitigation during the actual crises.

High perception of tsunami risks Prior to the 11 March disaster, the affected

coastal cities had already been expecting a major

earthquake (M 7.4) to occur with a 99% prob-

ability within the next thirty years, and the To-

hoku region had thus prepared intensively against

such risk (Mori and Takahashi, 2012: p.2). In the

Hazard map of Takada district

Municipal Office

Stairs Public loud speakers

Evacuation route

First Evacuation Point Evacuation Centres Watergate

Map 3. Example of a hazard map (Rikuzentakada City)

STUDY 05/20131 8 IDDRI

Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

estimation, the tsunami was predicted to have a

10.2 m run-up height in Rikuzentakada City and

7.3 m in Naraha town.21 On the basis of these esti-

mates, the municipalities had created hazard maps

to mark out the zone at risk of flooding in the re-

spective cities (Map 3). Based on the hazard maps,

evacuation drills were organised regularly. All of

the evacuees interviewed mentioned that they had

been informed of such risk prior to the disaster. In

addition, most of them were familiar with tsunami

disasters and knew what to do in such an event,

having learnt from previous experiences and sto-

ries told by the elderly.

The shortcomings of hazard maps The field survey found that the hazard maps desi-

gned to prepare the residents against tsunamis did

not always help to save lives in the actual disaster.

According to the local government employee of

Rikuzentakada City that we interviewed, the map

had indeed helped to raise the awareness of those

residents living in the predicted inundation zone

and prepare them for an eventual tsunami. On

the other hand, it also created a feeling of reas-

surance for those who lived outside the predicted

inundation zone, giving them the impression that

they were safe from the tsunami risk. Another map

shown by the same official during the interview

indicated the location of houses whose residents

lost their lives, and clearly shows the causal rela-

tionship between the hazard map and the survival

of individuals. On the map,22 it was evident that

victims resided just outside the predicted inun-

dation zone indicated on the hazard map – those

residents who were not included in the tsunami

drills. This suggests that the perception of risk and

the disaster preparedness did, in the vast majority

of cases, influence the survival of individuals at

the time of disaster.

Location of emergency evacuation points All four evacuees interviewed in Ishinomaki City

referred to the disaster as ‘man-made’, critici-

sing the local authority for insufficient prepare-

dness against a tsunami risk. In Ishinomaki City,

which had the highest death toll (3,47123) of all the

affected towns, survivors accuse the shortcomings

of the municipality’s disaster preparation as a main

21 Information provided by Rikuzentakada City and

Naraha town councils during the interview.

22 The map was shown to us by the official of Rikuzen-

takada City during the interview but he declined to pro-

vide us with a copy of such a sensitive document out of

respect for the victims’ families.

23 Source: Miyagi Prefectural Government (http://www.

pref.miyagi.jp/kikitaisaku/higasinihondaisinsai/

pdf/09071600.pdf) (in Japanese).

cause of this high fatality rate. One of their accusa-

tions targets the location of emergency evacuation

points. These points were generally designated at

schools and public buildings but also at public car

parks or a flat field. Originally intended as gathe-

ring points in case of fires or earthquakes, some of

them were situated on lower ground close to the

shoreline or on river banks. When the earthquake

hit on 11 March 2011, many inhabitants gathered

at these emergency points instead of taking refuge

on higher ground, quite simply because these

places were regularly used during disaster drills

as the first assembly points. As a result, some of

these residents lost their lives as the locations were

completely inundated by the tsunami. One of the

most tragic examples is the case of Okawa primary

school in Ishinomaki City. Teachers decided to

take the children to the emergency evacuation

point located on the river bank instead of climbing

the hill just next to the school, because it was the

evacuation point designated in the contingency

manual. As a result of this decision, 70% of the

school children and teachers lost their lives when

the tsunami travelled up the river.24

These instances indicate that the evacuation

points were not necessarily adapted to tsunami

disasters and that the residents were not adequate-

ly informed or trained for tsunami evacuations in

Ishinomaki City. This lesson needs to be properly

addressed in future disaster planning.

Vulnerability created by previous tsunami experiences During the interviews, municipal officials and

evacuees mentioned that having previous tsunami

experiences had sometimes adversely affected

individuals’ decision to flee and hence their

survival during the 11 March tsunami. It is often

assumed that people with previous disaster expe-

rience respond more effectively to a subsequent

disaster and that the lessons learnt from past

experience help them to avoid similar mistakes

in the future. As Alexandre Magnan argues in the

context of adaptive capacity to climate change, in

societies regularly exposed to natural hazards, the

experience of risk may confer a certain ability to

respond to a changing climate and to integrate its

effects (Magnan, 2010: p.8). Yet in the case of the

11 March disaster, although experience did help to

24 The newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun, ‘3.11 shogen: jidou, nakisakebi outo, gakkou saita no giseisya’ (Author’s

translation: Testimony of 3.11: screaming and vomiting

pupils, the worst death toll for schools), 19 April 2011; the newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, ‘hinan yori giron data 40 fun, giseisyatasuu no ookawasyou’ (Author’s transla-

tion: 40 minutes of discussion instead of evacuation pro-

duced many victims),

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