23 Feb Aristotles Theory of Hylomorphism Just as in Plato there is the Theory of Forms that summarizes the claims of Plato in his theory of reality, in Aristotle there is his Theory of Hylomorphis
philosophy writing question and need support to help me learn.
Part 1 is based on the Theory of Hlymorphism (E-LECTURE 6.1). Part 2 is based on the Theory of Ideogenesis (E-LECTURE 6.2). Be sure that you have carefully read and thought about the theory of Hylomorphism and the Theory of Ideogenesis of Aristotle before you do this OD.
Part 1- This is based on Aristotles Theory of Hylomorphism
1A. Based on this theory, what is the really real human for Aristotle?
1B. According to Aristotle, how are humans similar and different from each of the other natural bodies (i.e., animals, plants and minerals) referred to in his Theory of Hylomorphism?
1C. Why does Aristotle consider a human being to be like a microcosmos??
Part 2 This is based on Aristotles Theory of Ideogenesis
2A. Differentiate (for Aristotle) between: (1) percept and phantasm at least 2 differences; (2) agent intellect and passive intellect; and (3) phantasm and idea at least 3 differences
2B. What does Aristotle mean by abstraction??
2C. Why does Aristotle reject that claim that we have ?innate ideas?
Requirements: one paragraph each question
1 E-LECTURE 6.1 Aristotles Theory of Hylomorphism Just as in Plato there is the Theory of Forms that summarizes the claims of Plato in his theory of reality, in Aristotle there is his Theory of Hylomorphism that will give you some understanding of the claims Aristotle is making in his theory of reality. In this theory Aristotle (A) is trying to explain the essence of every natural body (included in natural body is the human being). In philosophy, essence of a thing refers to what makes the thing the kind of thing that it is (i.e., the what-ness of a thing). Aristotles Theory of Hylomorphism: NOTE: Hylomorphism was coined from ?hyle (meaning matter) and ?morphe (meaning form). [Hyle + Morphe = Hylomorphism] This is why this theory of A is also called the theory of matter and form. This is called a dualist view because it explains the essence of things by means of 2 principles (matter and form) as opposed to a monist view [that uses only one principle (hence, mono) to explain the essence of a thing]. This theory has only one claim. It says: Every natural body is made up of 2 essential principles: one, an indeterminate and determining principle called prime matter; and the other, a determining and determinate principle called substantial form. To understand this claim, we need to understand 4 key concepts in this claim: natural body, essence of a thing, prime matter, and substantial form. For A, natural body is the opposite of manufactured things (like tables, chairs, cars, chalk, etc.). So, a natural body is a being that already exists even before we manufactured or produced things. In other words, it is not made by humans; rather, it is already there when we begin to exist. That is why it is called ?natural body. For A, there are 4 kinds of natural bodies: human beings, animals, plants, and non-living bodies which A calls ?minerals (like stone, mountains, seas, rocks, etc.). The theory of hylomorphism is As way of explaining the essence of every natural body (not just the essence of human beings). By essence of thing, A means what makes a thing what it is (i.e., the what-ness of a thing). For A, Prime Matter (PM) alone is actually nothing but potentially something. It is actually nothing because you cannot say what it is. It has no characteristics or properties that would make it into a ?something. That is why A says the PM is an ?indeterminate principle. But it is
2 potentially something because it can become something when it receives a form. That is why A says the PM is a determinable principle. It can become a something when it receives a form. The form that it receives is what will make it into a ?something. That is why A says the form is a determining principle. For A, there are 2 kinds of form: substantial form (SF) and accidental form (AF). The SF is the form that when added to the PM, it determines the essence of a thing. What kind of thing it will be (for example, human being or animal or plant or mineral) will depend upon the kind of SF that is infused into or received by the PM. So, for A, PM alone or SF alone will not determine the essence of a thing. It has to be the substantial union of PM and SF. For A, there are 2 kinds of SF: the SF in non-living NB, and the SF in living NB. For A, the SF in living NB is called SOUL. For A, the soul (?psyche in Greek, ?anima in Latin) is the principle of life in a living natural body. But, how do you know if a being has a soul? For A, this question is the same as asking, how do you know if a being is living? To answer this question, A differentiates between 2 kinds of motion/act: transient motion/act, and immanent motion/act. In transient motion, the motion does not come from within the being itself; instead, there is an outside mover that is the cause of the motion (as when, for example, a chair is moved from the back of the room to the front of the room — it did not move because of itself. There is someone else that moved it). If all that the being can manifest is transient motion/act, then for A it is NOT a living thing (i.e., it does NOT have a soul). To be living (and therefor have a soul), it must be capable of immanent motion/act. In immanent motion the motion begins from within the being itself. There is no outside mover that is the cause of the motion. For A, immanent motion is what is indicative of life. For A, the kind of immanent motion that a being can perform will indicate the kind of soul that it has. For A, there are 3 kinds of soul: vegetative soul, sentient soul, and rational soul. For A, the vegetative soul is the SF of a plant. It enables the plant to do the immanent acts of nutrition (N), growth (G), and reproduction (R). For A, these (N, G, R) are the immanent acts that define a plant as a plant. To do the immanent acts of N, G, and R is the life that is proper to a plant as a plant. For A, the sentient soul is the SF of an animal. Like the plant, because of the sentient soul the animal is capable of the immanent acts of N, G, and R. But because the soul of the animal is not merely vegetative but rather sentient, the animal is capable of other immanent acts: locomotion (the capacity to move from place to place), and sentiency (capacity to sense). These immanent
3 acts of locomotion and sentiency are the immanent acts that define an animal as an animal. To do locomotion and sentiency is the life proper to an animal as animal. Sentiency has 2 aspects: the sentient cognitive aspects and the sentient appetitive aspects. In the animal, its sentient cognitive aspect is manifested through its capacity to know. The faculties that enable the animal to know are its senses which are 2 kinds: the 5 external senses and the 4 internal senses (which consist of instinct, sense memory, sense imagination and central or common sense). Through both the external and internal senses, the animal can know. Depending on what it knows about the object sensed or perceived, the animal develops certain appetites or tendencies either to seek the object known (if known to be good, pleasant or useful) or run away from the object known (if known to be bad, unpleasant or harmful). This is what is referred to by A as the sentient appetitive aspect in the animal. This sentient appetitive aspect is manifested through feelings and emotions. Because of this aspect, the animal can experience pleasure and pain or suffering. For A, the rational soul is the SF of a human being. Because of the rational soul, like the plant, a human being is capable of N, G, and R; and like an animal, a human being is capable of locomotion and sentiency (and everything that sentiency entails). What makes the human being different from the animal is its capacity of rationality. For A, rationality is manifested in the capacity to think and the capacity to choose. For A, we have the capacity to think because we have the faculty of the mind or reason; and we have the capacity to choose because we have the faculty of the will. The mind and the will are the faculties of the rational soul. For A, it is our rationality that defines us as human beings. Take away our rationality we are just animals. For A, it is when we do acts that involve our mind (through thinking) and our will (through choosing) that we are truly human. From this, we can infer the essence of a human being, according to Aristotle. For Aristotle, the human being is a substance (i.e., being that exists) that is material or bodily (this is what we share with nonliving bodies), living (that is capable of N, G, R like a plant), sentient (i.e., we have external and internal senses, and feelings and emotions like an animal), and rational (this is what make us to be persons, like the immaterial beings or pure spirits). For A, because there is a material aspect in us as well as an immaterial aspect, a human being is said to be like a micro-cosmos (a small universe or world). Some beings in the world are only material (minerals, plants, animals); some beings in the world are only immaterial (pure spirits). What makes the human being unique for A is that it is only the human being, among all the beings that exists, that has both a material aspect and an immaterial aspect. For A, there is only ONE World (universe) but this world has both a material aspect and an immaterial aspect. Because a human being also has both a material aspect and an immaterial aspect in its essence, Aristotle refers to a human being as being like a micro-cosmos.
4 For A, the real human is the substantial union of both body (aka PM) and rational soul (aka SF). Body alone or soul alone is not really human. The substantial union of body and rational soul is the essence of a human being. However, for A, there is no human being that exists that is just human being. Instead, what exists is this individual human being or that individual human being. So, to be this individual human (for example, Peter) or that individual human being (for example, Maria) there must be, in addition to the essence of a thing (which consists of PM and SF), there must also be what is called by A as the accidental form (AF). For A, the accidental form (in contrast to the SF) is the form that, when added to the essence of a thing (which consists of PM and SF), makes the thing the individual thing that it is, differentiating it from other things sharing in the same essence. For example, Peter is human; Maria is human. What makes Peter human is the same thing that makes Maria human. They share in the same essence. But what makes Peter, not just human, but this individual human being is the set of accidental forms (for example, being 6 feet tall, 165 lbs., student of SDSU, male, 20 yrs. old, etc.) in Peter. The same thing goes for Maria. Maria has the same essence as Peter (both are human beings), but what makes Maria not just human but this individual human being different from other human beings is the set of accidental forms (for example, being female, 100 lbs., mother, etc.) in Maria. For A, what exists is the individual thing which consists of PM, SF and AF. This is true not only for human beings, but for all natural bodies (including animals, plants and minerals).
1 E-LECTURE 6.2: Aristotles Theory of Ideogenesis The theory of Ideogenesis (ideo means idea and genesis means origin or beginning) is As explanation of how ideas are formed in our mind. For A, unlike Plato, our mind at birth is like a tabula rasa (blank tablet), which means that we do not have innate ideas. So, for A, all our ideas must be acquired. In the case of Plato, because of the previous existence of the soul in the other world, we already have innate ideas, which is why for P knowledge is merely recollection. In the case of A, since the rational soul does not pre-exist our body (as implied in his theory of hylomorphism), there is no way for our soul to already have knowledge before we are born. That is why A compares our mind at birth to a tabula rasa. It is for this reason that A claims we do not have innate ideas. Because of that, A has to explain how then do we acquire ideas. This is what his theory of ideogenesis is about. Since we do not have innate ideas for A, knowledge has to begin with the sense experience. For example, let us say we now have the idea of ?apple in our mind. For A, we do not have innate idea of ?apple. That idea (of apple?) must be acquired. So how does he explain how we form the idea of ?apple (and for that matter, each idea we now have in our mind)? A explains it in this way: First, let us say there is an apple on top of the table, and we are sensing the apple. The apple is the object to be known. This apple has sensible qualities (if you look at it, it is red; if you touch it, it is round, smooth, solid; if you taste it, it is crunchy and has a sweet-sour taste; if you smell it, it has the apple scent; etc.). These sensible qualities of the apple we are sensing stimulate or affect our external senses and, as result of that stimulation, our external senses form a sense impression of the apple. For A, this is the 1st level of knowledge. At this point we know that there is an object out there (the apple on the table) that is affecting us (i.e., our external senses it is something red, round, smooth, solid, crunchy, sweet-sour with a certain scent, etc. but we still do not know what that thing is (i.e., we still do not know that it is an apple that is affecting our external senses) Now, these sensible impressions of the apple are received by the central/common sense (one of our internal senses). Upon receiving these sensible impressions of the apple, the central sense will form an image of this object based on all these sensible impressions. This image of the object formed by the central sense from all the sensible impressions of it sent by the external senses is called the percept of the object (in this case, percept of an apple). For A, this is the 2nd level of knowledge. The percept of the object is the image of the object formed by the central sense corresponding to all the sensible impressions of it received by the external senses. At this point, we not only know that there is something out there affecting our external senses, but also now what this something is that is affecting us.
2 But while the percept of the object is a higher level of knowledge than our sensible impressions of it, this knowledge is still very limited because the central sense can only form the percept of the object when we are presently perceiving or sensing the object. If we are no longer perceiving the object, the percept of it also goes away. Fortunately for us, we have other internal senses that enable us to preserve this percept of the object. The percept of the object is transformed into a phantasm of the object by any of the other 3 internal senses (instinct, sense memory, and sense imagination) that we have. The phantasm of the object is the image of the object that our internal senses formed when we are no longer perceiving the object. For A, this is the 3rd level of knowledge. It corresponds exactly to the very object that is stimulating our external senses. Because of that, the phantasm is always about a particular, individual thing (so that, if for example, there are 2 apples we have perceived, there will be two different phantasms of those two apples). For A, the phantasm of the object is the highest level of knowledge that our senses can afford us. Once the phantasm of the object is formed, it is passed on to the agent intellect (NOTE: A calls the mind (or intellect or reason) by different names depending upon what particular activity the mind is involved in. So, the mind/reason and the agent intellect are one and the same faculty). Without the phantasm, there is nothing for the mind to begin thinking about (Remember, for A, we do not have innate ideas; so, the mind must wait for the phantasm of the object to be formed before it can begin to think). Upon receiving the phantasm of the object, the agent intellect will perform the act of abstraction on the phantasm. Abstraction is the act by which the mind separates one aspect of a thing (i.e., the universal aspect in the case of the phantasm of an apple, this would the characteristics contained in the phantasm of this apple that are found in most, if not all, apples) from its other aspects (i.e., the individuating aspect in the case of the phantasm of an apple, this would be the characteristics contained in the phantasm of this apple [like being red, having a ?bite, being bruised, having a worm inside, etc.] that can be found only in this apple but not in all or most apples). As a result of this abstraction the mind is able to grasp the essence of the thing (in this case the essence of an apple). A refers to this as the abstracted essence of the thing. This is 4th level of knowledge for A. At this point we now have an understanding of what makes the thing the thing that it is (in this case, we now know what makes an apple an apple). Once the mind has the abstracted essence of the thing, the passive intellect (Note: the passive intellect and the mind are one and the same faculty. A just calls the mind passive intellect because of the activity the mind is now involved in in this process of knowledge, just as A calls the mind the agent intellect when he wants to refer to the act of abstraction that the mind is performing), will now transform this abstracted essence of the thing into an IDEA. This is how The idea of the thing, for A, is the image of the thing formed by mind the represents the essence of that thing as grasped by the mind every idea that is now in our mind is formed. The formation of idea is just the beginning of what A calls the act of thinking. There are other acts of thinking (like judging, reasoning, etc.) that our mind can do, but it begins with first
3 forming an idea of the thing. For A, when we say we have an idea of a thing, it does not mean that we do not know what it and we have just some vague thoughts about it. Instead, for A, when we say have an idea of something, it means that our mind has grasped the essence of the thing and therefore we now know what it is, and therefore we can now differentiate it from other things. In other words, for A, to have an IDEA of something is to UNDERSTAND its essence (that is, understand what makes it what it is). For A, just like for P, real knowledge consists in knowing the essence of the thing (in the case of A, that is through the process of abstraction performed by the agent intellect; in the case of Plato, that is by recollecting the forms [which give essence to the things in this world] in the other world which our soul already had knowledge of before it was embodied). Also, for both P and A, we must rely on the mind [not the senses] to enable us to know the essence of the thing (in the case of A, the senses can only give us the phantasm of the thing; in the case of P, the senses only provide the occasion for recollecting).
