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References

Gunia, B. C. (2019) ‘Ethics in Negotiation: Causes and Consequences’, Academy of

Management Perspectives, 33(1), pp. 3–11. doi: 10.5465/amp.2018.0043.

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Ethics in Negotiation: Causes and Consequences

Why do negotiators act ethically or unethically? What happens after they do? Despite

accumulating evidence on the causes and consequences of ethical and unethical

behavior in non-negotiation situations, surprisingly few attempts have been made to

examine these issues systematically within the negotiation context. This is problematic

because it contributes to the somewhat stale viewpoint that unethical negotiation behavior

is both inevitable and uniformly harmful. It also impedes progress in both the negotiation

and the behavioral ethics literatures and limits our field's ability to train ethical negotiators.

As a step toward refreshing the field's perspective on the causes and consequences of

ethical and unethical negotiation behavior, the current symposium assembles four papers

by leading scholars of ethics and negotiation. Collectively, they aim to provide a bird's-eye

view on the numerous causes (e.g., moral character, ethical fading, environmental cues)

and surprisingly diverse consequences attending ethical and unethical negotiation, both

reviewing current knowledge and looking to the future. Overall, we suggest that unethical

behavior is not inevitable in negotiation nor necessarily detrimental for either negotiator.

Rather, science can reliably anticipate negotiators' ethical choices and the consequences

that attend them—and urgently should.

Keywords: ethical; unethical; negotiation

Why do negotiators act ethically or unethically? Despite a vast trove of psychological

research on the drivers of ethical and unethical behavior in non-negotiation situations (for

summaries, see [18]; [28]), surprisingly few attempts have been made to catalog and

theoretically ground the set of reasons why negotiators adopt ethical or unethical

approaches at the bargaining table. This is problematic because it contributes to the stale

yet prevalent view that, in negotiation, ethical behavior is impossible and unethical

behavior is inevitable. In addition to conflicting with the available evidence, this view

impedes progress in both the negotiation and the behavioral ethics literatures and limits

our ability to train ethical negotiators.

And what are the consequences of ethical or unethical negotiating? In terms of unethical

negotiating, the answer appears relatively obvious, as many studies have documented the

numerous negative consequences of deception for both the deceiver and the deceived.

Although deceptive negotiators may extract some short-term benefits (e.g., [ 3]; [20]; [23]),

deception is seen as quite detrimental overall. As just a few of the many examples,

deception reduces trust (e.g., [20]), prompts retaliation (e.g., [ 3]), and harms the

deceiver's economic outcomes ([ 7]).

The near consensus is illusory, however, as the great majority of the just-mentioned

papers study a very specific unethical behavior: self-interested deception in which an

individual overtly provides inaccurate information. We know much less about the many

other types of unethical behavior documented in psychological studies of non-negotiation

situations, and virtually nothing about the consequences of overt ethicality in negotiation.

This too is problematic, as it contributes to the equally stale viewpoint that deception in

negotiation is necessarily harmful, at least for the deceived and probably for the deceiver.

In addition to conflicting with some of the available evidence and impeding theoretical

progress, this view leaves us with few explanations for the proliferation of deception in real

negotiations ([22]).

We assembled the current symposium in hopes of refreshing the field's perspective on the

causes and consequences of ethical and unethical negotiation. In so doing, our goals

were to 1) identify insights from other fields (particularly psychology) that could advance

research on ethics in negotiation, 2) identify insights from negotiation that could advance

research in other fields (particularly macro-level management areas), and 3) promote

ethical negotiation in the real world. The four symposium papers, each written by authors

with expertise in both ethics and negotiation, briefly summarize the state of the art on a

particular aspect of ethics in negotiation. More important, each also offers a unique

perspective that challenges and advances our understanding of the topic. Finally, each at

least implicitly draws out the implications for related research areas, building missing

bridges and highlighting pressing and often intriguing areas for future research.

Three symposium papers consider causes of ethical and unethical negotiation, drawing

from the psychological and organizational behavior work on behavioral ethics to discuss

causes rarely studied in the negotiation literature: moral character (Morse & Cohen),

ethical fading (Rees, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman), and environmental cues (Gunia). As a

group, these papers apply the psychological insight that personal and situational factors

interact to shape behavior in many situations ([21]) to ethics in negotiation. The final

symposium paper (Gaspar, Methasani, & Schweitzer) develops an integrative model

detailing the surprising diversity of consequences that attend negotiators' choice to

deceive. We include only one paper on consequences by design, as this paper assumes a

higher level of analysis, presenting a model that seeks to cover the current evidentiary

base in total. Collectively, the symposium aims to offer a bird's-eye view of the causes

and consequences of ethics in negotiation, both as we see them today and as the

contributors believe we should see them tomorrow.

In sum, this symposium seeks to move the scholarly conversation beyond the view that

unethical behavior is inevitable and uniformly harmful in negotiation. Instead, these papers

advance the innovative perspective that unethical as well as overtly ethical behaviors

arise among certain scientifically predictable individuals, because of certain predictable

situational factors, with certain predictable costs and benefits. We hope these ideas will

interest an array of scholars from across academic management.

In particular, we hope management scholars who do not specialize in negotiation will walk

away with a refined appreciation of the ethical choices and consequences that real

negotiators face, perhaps concluding that ethical negotiation is possible even though

unethical negotiation can be surprisingly beneficial. Additionally, we hope these scholars

find connections to their own work, particularly on topics related to ethics (e.g., value-

based decisions such as corporate social responsibility, consumer relations, and crisis

management) or negotiation (e.g., interdependent decisions such as top management

team interactions, strategic alliances, and CEO–board relations). Of course, we also hope

the symposium benefits scholars of negotiation and/or behavioral ethics, for whom it maps

out the landscape of causes and consequences in current research as well as the

numerous opportunities for future work. Finally, we hope the symposium interests

negotiation teachers and practitioners who wish to elicit ethical negotiation in the real

world, or at least understand the consequences of ethical and unethical negotiating.

Having summarized our collective aims and the papers' basic messages, the rest of this

introduction will discuss but not seek to rehash the individual papers. Each speaks clearly

on its own. Instead, I aim to draw out the key contributions and themes that emerge when

considering the papers in gestalt, noting novel connections and intriguing implications for

future research. In the process of detailing contributions arising specifically from the

causes or consequences sections, I will build up to a discussion of themes that emerge

from the whole symposium. The introduction concludes with a discussion of implications

for future research.

A final note before proceeding: Like most people who read the academic discourse on

ethical and unethical behavior, you may be wondering what those terms mean. The short

answer is that the symposium does not offer a unified definition. That is, these papers, like

many in the literature, adopt differing definitions. Two symposium papers (Gunia's and

Gaspar et al.'s) focus on one of the most socially agreed upon forms of unethical

behavior: deception. While few behavioral ethics scholars would dispute the

operationalization of unethical behavior as deception, this operationalization is also

relatively narrow. The other two papers take a broader view, focusing on a variety of

stable tendencies (Morse & Cohen) or observable behaviors (Rees et al.). This diversity of

definition is consistent with much of the behavioral ethics literature. Additionally, we

consider it a distinct strength, as it allows us to pose provocative questions such as "Can

we really define universally beneficial behaviors as unethical?" (implicit in Gaspar et al.)

and "Is ethical negotiating necessarily desirable?" (implicit in Rees et al.). So we

acknowledge the diversity but do not attempt to apologize for it, trusting our readers to

judge the adequacy of our definitions and understand the diversity of our viewpoints. In

closing, thank you for your interest. We hope you find our perspectives useful.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF CAUSES PAPERS: ETHICAL ≠ IMPOSSIBLE AND UNETHICAL

≠ INEVITABLE

Negotiation practitioners and scholars have long assumed, at least implicitly, that

unethical behavior and negotiation go hand in hand. Put differently, many people with

varying perspectives on negotiation assume that ethical behavior is nearly impossible in

negotiation situations or, equivalently, that unethical behavior is nearly inevitable. For

example, a prominent practitioner-oriented article indicated that "when it comes to

negotiation, the process is often strewn with falsehoods and deception" ([ 1], p. 69).

Likewise, scholars have noted the ubiquity of deception in negotiations, sometimes finding

that deception occurs in the majority or even great majority of negotiation situations (e.g., [

2]).

These claims are striking for several reasons, one of which is the high degree of

consensus both within the scholarly community and across the scholarly–practitioner

divide. Few aspects of human behavior would seem to attract such widespread social

consensus. The assumption that negotiation = unethical behavior is also striking for its

contrast with the related but distinct behavioral ethics literature, which assumes that the

causes of deception are worthy of scientific study. In particular, this literature presumes

that science can reliably predict which people will act unethically and when they will do so.

If all negotiators in all negotiations deceive, the topic is not particularly interesting.

Luckily, the three symposium papers focusing on the causes of ethical and unethical

negotiating cast doubt on this conclusion, suggesting that unethical behavior arises

among certain scientifically predictable negotiators, because of certain predictable

features of the negotiation situation. In other words, the papers suggest that not all

negotiators act unethically, and not all negotiation situations call for unethical behavior.

One of the symposium's key contributions, then, is to cast doubt on the widespread

assumptions that ethical = impossible and unethical = inevitable in negotiation. Another is

to identify who the routinely ethical and unethical negotiators might be, as well as what the

ethically supportive and ethically treacherous negotiation situations might be.

So what do they say? Morse and Cohen's paper speaks to the first issue, suggesting that

individuals high in moral character are naturally prone to ethical negotiating, resisting the

sway of unethical behavior despite the distinct possibility that it might literally pay. The

other two papers on causes speak to the second issue: Rees and colleagues suggest that

certain predictable features of the negotiation situation (e.g., incentives, competition) can

contribute to ethical fading, which leads negotiators to display bounded ethicality. Gunia,

in turn, suggests that certain predictable features of the physical and temporal

environment surrounding the negotiators (e.g., money, time of day) can elicit both

distributive and deceptive negotiating. Although several of the papers mention interactions

between personal and situational factors (e.g., Morse and Cohen's discussion of moral

character in intergroup contexts), none focuses directly on this interaction—an important

direction for future research discussed below.

Collectively, these papers call the inevitability of unethical behavior into question, moving

toward a comprehensive, scholarly view of the factors that cause ethical and unethical

negotiating. In the process, they provide a powerful set of theoretical frameworks for

applying the many and varied findings from the behavioral ethics literature to negotiation.

Rees and colleagues' focus on bounded ethicality and fading, for example, provides a

lens for understanding how and why the psychological finding that groups lie more readily

than individuals ([ 5]) may apply to group negotiations.

In addition to questioning the inevitability of unethical negotiating, these papers also

question its intentionality—the assumption that self-interested negotiators overtly choose

to check their ethics at the door ([ 1]; [ 4]). Indeed, none of the papers focuses on the

intentional choice to deceive. Each focuses on a factor—moral character, ethical fading,

or environmental cues—that presumably influences ethical or unethical negotiation at

least partially outside of the negotiator's awareness. This too brings the negotiation

literature into closer alignment with the behavioral ethics literature. It also provides an

important corrective to the devious and plotting portrait often painted of the negotiator.

Finally, it highlights how many seemingly benign features of the situation—a negotiation

room's messiness (Gunia), for example—might lead to unexpected unethicality.

Conversely, it highlights how otherwise dubious features of the situation—a negotiator's

complete, consolidated power (Rees et al.), for example—could lead to unexpected

ethicality.

Finally, the three papers on causes (and particularly the two on situational causes) point

toward interventions that could encourage more ethical negotiation in the real world. Rees

and colleagues' paper, for example, suggests that slight differences in the words used to

frame a negotiation can lead to entirely different sets of ethical assumptions. Gunia's

highlights a wide variety of ways that knowing negotiators could alter the physical or

temporal environment in which the negotiation unfolds (e.g., by wearing particular colors).

While these perspectives raise new ethical questions of their own (covered in the future

research section below), suffice it to say here that the papers afford resourceful

negotiators with an array of ideas for stimulating their own and their counterparts' ethical

compasses.

Overall, the three papers covering the causes of ethical and unethical negotiating suggest

that negotiation should not be confused with an ethical free-for-all. Instead, science offers

substantial guidance about the negotiators among whom—and negotiation situations in

which—ethical and unethical behavior is likely. In this sense, the papers portray

negotiations as much more akin to everyday situations (studied by the behavioral ethics

literature) than commonly assumed. Yet the papers also suggest that negotiations—and

especially their socially interactive features—introduce interesting wrinkles of their own.

As described below, the papers collectively seek to avoid a trade deficit with the

behavioral ethics literature by exporting this idea and others, even as they import decades

of useful findings.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONSEQUENCES PAPER: ETHICAL ≠ DESIRABLE AND

UNETHICAL ≠ HARMFUL

Negotiation practitioners and scholars have also assumed, at least implicitly, that

unethical behavior in negotiation is inherently and necessarily bad for the deceived and

probably for the deceiver. For example, [24], p. 99) concluded an article on the legality

and ethicality of lying in negotiation by saying: "In negotiation, people who rely on the

letter of legal rules as a strategy for plotting unethical conduct are likely to get in deep

trouble. But people who rely on a cultivated sense of right and wrong to guide them in

legal matters are likely to do well." Likewise, authors such as [ 1] and [ 4] clearly

suggested that deceived negotiators tend to suffer serious harm. Finally, scholars have

long argued that deception in negotiation is immoral (e.g., [ 2]; [25]). And they have often

documented the ubiquitous consequences of unethical negotiation behavior and

especially deception, showing, for example, that deception often harms deceivers by

reducing their perceived trustworthiness (e.g., [20]), motivating their counterparts to

retaliate (e.g., [ 3]), and hampering their economic outcomes ([ 7]). Likewise, deceived

negotiators often perform worse ([20]; [23]), even when they detect the deception (and

choose to spend economic resources punishing the deceiver; [ 3]).

Again, these claims are striking, both for the high degree of social consensus and for the

contrast with behavioral ethics research, which increasingly assumes that the

consequences of deception are worthy of scientific study. Although research in this area is

less voluminous than research on antecedents, accumulating evidence focusing

specifically on deception clearly suggests that deception is not necessarily harmful for

either party. Rather, this work indicates that deception is a multidimensional construct, the

unpacking of which reveals its multifaceted and sometimes neutral or even beneficial

effects for all concerned ([10]; [13], [14]). In contrast to these papers' implication that the

consequences of unethical behavior merit scientific study, the common assumption that

deception in negotiation is primarily harmful suggests little need to inquire further.

Gaspar and colleagues' symposium paper on the consequences of deception calls this

assumption, too, into question. By highlighting the literature's relatively narrow focus on

"self-interested, informational lies of commission" (p. 62) and unpacking the

multidimensional features of deception in negotiation, Gaspar and colleagues suggest that

deception in negotiation is not necessarily harmful for the deceiver or even the deceived.

Indeed, although it is easy to see how deception could benefit the deceiver in the short

term, this paper highlights several contexts in which deception may benefit the deceived

too—or at least serve the deceiver without substantially harming the deceived. In

particular, the paper suggests that the effects of deception in negotiation depend on three

scientifically predictable dimensions of the deception itself: intentionality (whether the

deception is self-interested or prosocial), content (whether it involves information or

emotions), and activity (whether it takes the form of commission, omission, or paltering).

These dimensions form the basis of a deception consequence model (DCM) that suggests

that deception is not necessarily harmful for either negotiator and can sometimes benefit

both (e.g., in cases of prosocial deception). This also implies the reverse: that, at least in

negotiations, ethical behavior may not always be desirable.

This model and its implications afford a much more comprehensive view of deception's

consequences in negotiation as well as a corrective to the clichéd view that deception is

necessarily and uniformly bad. Indeed, the model problematizes the use of the word

"bad," as it implicates a behavior—deception—that moral philosophers (e.g., [12]) and

negotiation scholars (e.g., [ 2]) have equated with "unethical." But if the behavior benefits

everyone, can we reasonably call it "bad"? And what about "unethical"? Or does

negotiation offer a setting in which "unethical" behaviors can sometimes be considered

"good"? These are intriguing questions for both philosophers and scholars of

negotiation—topics reminiscent of Rees and colleagues' call for a scholarly consensus

about the meaning and desirability of ethical behavior in negotiation.

More concretely, the DCM helps to pull back the curtain on the reasons why we observe

deception in real-world negotiations. If deception is inherently "bad" for both negotiators,

then a social scientist could reasonably expect to detect little in the real world, or at least

among experienced negotiators. As discussed in the section above, however, scientists

and practitioners make no such assumption: They tend to concur that deception in

negotiation is rampant, with few exceptions for experience. Without the DCM, we have

few tools to explain this conclusion. With the DCM, we know that at least some of the

deception that emerges probably emerges for a scientifically predictable reason: because

it potentially benefits both negotiators, or at least one without harming the other (much like

a logrolling trade-off). Indeed, the model suggests that negotiators who deceive do not

necessarily act irrationally or even self-interestedly; in some circumstances, their

deception may reflect rationality or even benevolence.

Finally, and similarly to the section above, Gaspar and colleagues implicitly highlight many

interventions that could minimize deception's costs in the real world. Negotiators inclined

to deceive, for example, could at least direct their deception toward prosocial lies,

emotional forms of misleading, or omission rather than commission. These implications,

again, raise ethical questions of their own, some of which I discuss below. Nevertheless,

both the practical and the theoretical implications of Gaspar and colleagues' paper come

through clearly: Ethicality is not always desirable, and unethicality not always harmful for

either negotiator.

OVERALL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

This symposium represents the first known attempt to collect a set of papers that consider

the causes and consequences of ethical and unethical negotiating in tandem. Doing so is

critical for several reasons. First, it provides a bird's-eye view of ethical and unethical

negotiating both before and after it happens, cataloging both what we know and what we

need to know at both stages. Second, a concurrent consideration of causes and

consequences helps us see why and how the causes might matter. Considering the costs

and benefits of deception in negotiation, for example, helps us understand why we should

care about a negotiation room's lighting conditions (Gunia), as well as the positive and

negative consequences of a poorly lit room. Finally, considering both causes and

consequences helps to highlight specific, interesting, and previously unconsidered

research questions. To highlight just one, a reader of these papers might wonder whether

a low- or high-character negotiator (Morse & Cohen) might find it easier to engage in

mutually beneficial forms of prosocial deception (Gaspar et al.).

On a theoretical level, the papers collectively highlight a disconnect between the

behavioral ethics literature and negotiation research. They paint the disconnect as

puzzling, in that the two literatures have much in common. But they also paint it as

surmountable and build numerous theoretical bridges, highlighting specific ways in which

the two literatures could productively engage. Morse and Cohen, for example, provide an

outline for applying psychological work on interindividual–intergroup discontinuity (e.g., [

6]) to negotiations. Overall, the papers import the basic psychological insight that the

person, situation, and interaction between them can explain many aspects of human

behavior ([21]), including deception ([26]). At the same time, they export the negotiation

literature's insight that true, immersive social interactions with real individuals have

fundamentally different qualities than interactions with briefly encountered or imagined

others. Because the behavioral ethics literature has tended to focus on the latter (albeit

not exclusively), it may benefit from the insights in some of these papers (e.g., Morse &

Cohen, Gunia) about the ways in which tru

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